

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
WASHINGTON, D. C.

25 YEAR RE-REVIEW

22 April 1946


MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, CENTRAL PLANNING STAFF

1. In connection with the recommendation contained in paragraph 2 of the attached memorandum, it is suggested that the phrase "next of kin" may be interpreted to mean only the immediate family of the individual concerned. In the case of an American citizen married to a Polish girl, for example, such an interpretation would include her as a member of the immediate family, but would not include the members of her family who may still be living in Poland.

2. It is believed that the provision in question should cover the "next of kin" of both husband and wife and the following wording is recommended:

"3a. of excellent character who are native born citizens of the United States and who have no member of the immediate family or next of kin thereof subject to a foreign power."

STAT


Colonel, AC

CONFIDENTIAL

22 April 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR: Admiral Souers

SUBJECT: Proposed Policy on Clearance of
personnel for Duties with C.I.G.

ENCLOSURE: Memo for Director of Central Intelligence from
Acting Chief, Central Planning Staff, same sub-
ject, dated 11 April (received by Secretary,
N.I.A., on 15 April)

1. At the C.I.G. Council meeting this morning the following ques-
tions were raised with reference to the enclosures:

a. Should the responsibility for security clearance rest with
the departments, as provided in paragraph 6 of the proposed directive,
or with the C.I.G.?

b. Is it necessary that the proposed directive be approved by
the I.A.B., or should it be issued individually by the Director of
Central Intelligence?

c. Should exceptions require concurrence by member departments
of C.I.G., as provided in paragraph 12 of the proposed directive, or
should the Director of Central Intelligence be authorized to make ex-
ceptions as he sees fit?

2. With reference to 1-a above, it was agreed that in any case re-
sponsibility for the security of C.I.G. rests with the Director, re-
gardless of the arrangements for investigation and clearance of indi-
viduals. Central Planning Staff feels that security clearance should
be done by the departments as part of their responsibility for furnish-
ing C.I.G. personnel, since the individuals are employees of the various
departments. It was pointed out, however, that the proposed directive
does not provide for mandatory review by C.I.G. It was also stated that
investigation and clearance by the departments might take a considerable
length of time (90 to 120 days in the case of War). Placing the re-
sponsibility for investigation and clearance in C.I.G. rather than the
departments would have the following effects:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

a. A larger security office in C.I.G. probably would be required.

b. Security checks would be expedited.

c. Final clearance would be performed in C.I.G. where the ultimate responsibility resides in any case.

3. It was believed that the answer to 1-b above depends on the answer to 1-a. If the departments are to be responsible for investigation and clearance, it appears appropriate to obtain the concurrence of the I.A.B. to the proposed directive. If C.I.G. is to conduct the investigation and clearance, the directive might be issued by the Director without reference to the I.A.B.

4. With reference to 1-c, one viewpoint was that the Director should be authorized to grant exceptions without further concurrences and their resultant delay. The other viewpoint was that the security representatives of the permanent I.A.B. members should concur in exceptions since C.I.G. personnel will be handling highly classified material from all departments.

5. The C.I.G. Council agreed that paragraph 3-a of the proposed directive should be re-worded as follows:

"of excellent character who are native-born citizens of the United States and who have no member of the immediate family or next of kin thereof subject to a foreign power."

"SIGNED"

JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Secretary, N.I.A.

CONFIDENTIAL